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Abstract 
Most comparative studies of public policies for competitiveness focus on the links among public 
agencies and industrial sectors. This paper argues that the professions---or knowledge-bearing 
elites-that animate these organizational links are equally significant. For public policies to 
promote technological advance, the visions and self-images of knowledge-bearing elites are par­
ticularly important. By examining administrative and technical elites in France and Germany in 
the 1980s, the paper identifies characteristics that enable these elites to implement policy in 
some cases, but not in others. France's "state-created" elites were well-positioned to initiate and 
implement large technology projects, such as digitizing the telecommunications network. 
Germany's state-recognized elites were, by contrast, better positioned to facilitate framework­
oriented programs that aimed at the diffusion of new technologies throughout industry. The 
linkages among administrative and technical elites also explain why French policymakers had 
difficulty adapting policy to changing circumstances over time while German policymakers 
managed in many cases to learn more from previous policy experiences and to adapt subse­






Industrial Performance in France and Germany· 

J. Nicholas Ziegler 
Several strands of social science analysis have begun to redirect attention to the importance 
of knowledge-bearing groups in processes of political and economic change. This 
development has been clearest in studies of international policy coordination, where 
"epistemic communities" have been treated as important explanatory factors in areas ranging 
from arms control to environmental protection.2 An interest in expert groups has been 
slightly less prominent in comparative politics, but studies of national economic policies have 
given considerable attention to different schools of economists and their political influence. 3 
At the level of practical knowledge, the accumulation of production skills has become a 
1 Institutional and financial support for this research was provided by the Center for European Studies, Harvard 
University, and the Max-Planck Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne. Earlier versions were presented at the 
American Political Science Convention, Chicago, Illinois, September, 1992, and at the Sloan Comparativists Group, 
November, 1992. For assistance, comments, and criticisms, I would especially like to thank Edgar Grande, Mauro 
Guillen, Peter Hall, Jargen Hausler, Richard Locke, Cathie Martin, Renate Mayntz, Robert Putnam, Richard Samuels, 
David Vogel, Margaret Weir, and Eleanor Westney. Interpretations and data are the responsibility of the author. 
2 See the essays in Peter M. Haas, ed., International Organization, 46:1 (Winter 19921. 
3 See the essays in Peter A. Hall, ed .• The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
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central question in comparative studies of work organization.4 Parallel to these discussions, 
sociologists and historians of the professions have embarked on broader efforts to compare 
knowledge-bearing groups and their emergence in industrial societies. 5 
This paper argues that the politics of knowledge-bearing elites can also help resolve 
many of the outstanding puzzles regarding comparative industrial performance. As 
technological innovation takes on a growing role in competitive outcomes, the knowledge-
bearing occupations take a central role in public strategies for industrial change. The 
pathways by which these groups make different kinds of knowledge available to industrial 
enterprises can be decisive in the processes that lead some fIrms to fourish and others to 
disappear. Since the distribution of knowledge across public and private organizations varies 
dramatically from country to country, it imposes important conditions on the policies that 
public offIcials can effectively employ in different countries. Yet, the distribution of 
knowledge is more than a fIxed constraint on policy. Knowledge flows through channels that 
reflect deeply engrained ideas about the prestige and authority of different professional 
groups. For this reason, policy depends in overlooked ways on the self-images and prestige 
hierarchies that inform relations among administrative and technical elites. 
This paper develops this argument on the basis of cases drawn from France and 
Germany. In Part One, I review existing explanations of the state's efforts to promote 
industrial performance. In Part Two, I defIne more precisely how to classify policy efforts 
4 See Charles Sabel, Work and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
6 See the essays in Rolf Torstendahl and Michael Burrage, eds., The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State 
and Strategy (London: Sage, 1990) and Michael Burrage and Rolf Torstendahl, Professions in Theory and History: 
Rethinking the Study of the Professions (London: Sage, 1990). 
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to promote competitiveness. In Part Three, I compare French and German policy efforts to 
boost competiveness in two sectors, telecommunications and machine tools. In Part Four, I 
discuss the generalizability of results from the French and German cases. 
L EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
Several strands of inquiry support the view that knowledge has become a central determinant 
in the industrial performance of firms and countries alike. Theories of the firm have focused 
increasingly on internal resources, including human resources. Growth theorists are also 
actively trying to refine the treatment of human capital, including educational levels and 
inventive activities, in models of endogenous growth. Similarly, trade economists have 
found that R&D activities can exert decisive effects on industrial leadership in particular 
industries. Debates on the sources of competitiveness variously stress the importance of 
workforce skills, scientific knowledge and other intangible factor inputs.6 Despite these 
tantalizing results, political scientists have done little to integrate an analysis of knowledge-
carrying elites into the comparative examination of explicit policy efforts to bolster industrial 
performance. 
8 For developments in theory of the firm, see Michael Best, "Theoretical Perspectives on the Firm," chapter 4 in 
The New Competition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990); Birger Wernerfelt, "A Resource-Based View of 
the Firm," Strategic Management Journal. 5 (1984): 171-180; and Gary Hansen and Birger Wernerfelt, "The 
Determinants of Firm Performance: The Relative Importance of Economic and Organizational Factors," Strategic 
Management Journal. 10 (1989): 399-411. For growth theory and its use in models of trade performance, see 
respectively Paul Romer. "Endogenous Technical Change, Journal of Political Economy. 98:5, part 2 (October 1990): 
S71-S 1 02 and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1991). For management theories. see Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free 
Press, 1990), esp. 74-77. 
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Earlier debates on industrial perfonnance revolved around the categories of state 
capacity and market outcomes. Political scientists contributed to these debates by 
illuminating institutional levers that enabled public officials in different countries to shape 
market outcomes in different ways. This approach tended to inscribe knowledge-bearing 
groups within a organizational approach to state and non-state actors.7 The emphasis on 
organizational structure was largely a corrective to earlier pluralist approaches, which 
conceptualized public policy as a simple resultant of shifting societal pressures.8 In this 
sense, industrial policy represented an important area for exploring the state's capacity to 
allocate resources preferentially to sectors that were thought to contribute disproportionately 
to the state's long-term agenda. 
There was little doubt that this strand of institutionalist writing treated technical 
expertise as an important resource contributing to the state's effectiveness. Theda Skocpol 
noted that the state's ability to retain "loyal and skilled officials" had long been counted 
among the "sinews of state power.,,9 The broader research program envisioned a 
"relational" approach to state and non-state actors. According to the editors of Bringing the 
State Back In, a full understanding of state interventions required "a better understanding of 
the historically evolved interrelations between states and 'knowledge-bearing occupations,' 
7 Some of the principal works include William Atkinson and Michael Coleman, ·Strong State and Weak State,­
British Journal of Political Science, 19 (January 1989); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial 
Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19861; Maurice Wright and Stephen Wilks, £Ids.. Comparative 
Government-Industry Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); John Zysman, Government, Markets, and Growth: 
Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
8 James P. March and Johan P. Olson, "The New Institutionalism," American Political Science Review, 78 
(September 19841. 
9 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,· in Peter Evans, £It. aI., 
eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge, 19851. 16. 
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particularly the modern social science professions. to In terms of demonstrating state 
capacities, however, the editors recommended "the identification of specific organizational 
structures the presence (or absence) of which seems critical to the ability of state authorities 
to undertake given tasks."10 Partly because they were easier to document, the structural as 
opposed to the process or cognitive characteristics of organizations received priority. 
This structural approach to organizations was extended to the concept of policy 
networks, which were seen as clusters of organizations linked together by resource 
dependencies. ll The cognitive and informal aspects of these networks were usually brought 
into the analysis as contextual -- and causally subordinate -- factors. 12 The ability of non-
state actors to mobilize expertise was recognized. But there was little attention given to the 
role of expert groups or any other transorganizational associations that might animate such 
policy networks. 13 
10 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, ·On the Road Toward a More Adequate 
Understanding of the State," in Evans, et. aI., eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge, 1986), pp. 
361, 369. 
11 Important examples include Peter Katzenstein, • Conclusion, " in Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: 
Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); William 
Atkinson and Michael Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist 
Economies," British Journal of Political Science, 19 (January 1989); and Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, 
"Conclusion: Comparing Government-Industry Relations: States, Sectors, and Networks," in Wilks and Wright, eds., 
Comparative Government-Industry Relations: Wesxtern Europe. the United States, and Japan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 274-313). Recent reviews of this literature are provided in R.A.W. Rhodes, ·Policy 
Networks: A British Perspective," Journal of Theoretical Policies, 2:3 (1990): 293-317; Grant Jordan, "Sub­
Governments, Policy Communities and Networks: Refilling the old Bottles1" Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2:3 
(1990): 319-338; and Patrick Kenis and Volker Scheider, ·Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scurtinizing a New 
Analytical Toolbox,· in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations (Frankfurt: Campus, 1991). 
'2 For mentions of such informal links, see Peter Katzenstein, "Small Nations in an Open International Economy," 
in Peter Evans., et. aI., eds., Bringing the State Back In, pp. 233, 243, and Wilks and Wright, pp. 284 ff. 
13 One exception, which deals with health policy and transport policy, is R.A.W. Rhodes, 
The National World of Local Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). 
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The tendency to focus on the structural characteristics of the organizations in a policy 
network has contributed to several difficulties in explaining the variations observed in state 
capacities. First, as is now well known. state capacities cannot be inferred directly from the 
structural characteristics of the state alone. State power clearly varies across policy 
sectors,14 and even highly centralized states are obliged to rely on external networks in 
important cases. IS Second, structural analysis tends to bracket out those aspects of the 
policy process that explain the links (or gaps) between policy formulation and policy 
implementation. Several studies have shown that the processes of bargaining and securing 
consent are central to the state's ability to implement policies in areas ranging from 
environmental regulation to energy sourcing. 16 Third. a narrow focus on the structural 
characteristics of organizations, cannot explain the adaptation of policy over time. 
Organizational structures impose constraints on the actions of state and non-state actors, but 
the motives that lead to action in the first place also need to be specified. 
More recent work on the comparative forms of capitalism seeks to ameliorate the 
stark dichotomy between state and market by examining a range of institutions from fmancial 
14 Atkinson and Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States"; Wilks and Wright, "Conclusion: Comparing 
Government-Industry Relations: States, Sectors, and Networks." 
15 Harvey B. Feigenbaum, The Politics of Public Enterprise (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986) and Richard J. 
Samuels, The Business of the Japanese: State Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 19871. 
16 David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986). esp. 284, and Samuels. The Business of the Japanese State. 
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systems and labor markets to supplier networks and business associations. 17 While different 
authors emphasize different institutions, management theorists have entered the debate by 
stressing the links between country characteristics and company strategies. This approach is 
well represented by Michael Porter's Competitiveness of Nations. One of Porter's principal 
achievements is his demonstration that the most competitive firms in a particular industry do 
indeed "cluster" in particular countries. Owing to its compelling empirical foundation, 
Porter's work has established that explanations of country competitiveness must discriminate 
among different industries. Porter explains the performance of industry clusters through four 
types of variables: factor inputs; demand characteristics; the strength of supplier and buyer 
industries in the same country; and intra-industry rivalry. 
One of the weaknesses of his approach is that Porter does not show why these 
explanatory categories have to change at the boundaries of national territories instead of 
(subnational) industrial districts or (supernational) blocs. Since Porter relegates 
"government" to peripheral status in his explanatory scheme (on the same par with 
"chance"), he cannot fully explore any of the institutions sustained primarily by the political 
order -- precisely those that covary most clearly with national borders. Porter's framework 
can also be faulted for providing little insight into the process by which public officials might 
strengthen the conditions for competitiveness in different countries. 
While other works in the management literature on competitiveness give more 
attention to the problem of geographic scope and levels of analysis, none of them claim to 
17 See, for example, Michel Albert, Capitalism Against Capitalism (London: Whurr, 19931; Jeffrey E. Garten. A 
Cold Peace: America. Japan. Germany. and the Struggle for Supremacy (New York: Times Books, 1992); Jeffrey-A. 
Hart, Rival Capitalists: International Competitiveness in the United States. Japan. and Western Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1992); and Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
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untangle the mix of country and industry effects that explain why successful clusters emerge 
in some countries and not in others. \8 This article approaches the problem by comparing 
institutional features that are constant within countries but that interact with industry 
characteristics in ways that plausibly explain sector-specific outcomes. For sectors 
characterized by rapid or extensive technological change, the expert professions are central. 
II. ELEMENTS OF THE ARGUMENT 
As technological change has taken on growing analytic significance in explanations of 
economic growth, it has also gained in political appeal. Political leaders in almost all 
advanced industrial countries have seized upon technology because it offers a politically more 
attractive response to international competition than shedding jobs or investing in long-term 
educational reforms that promise slim electoral payoffs. When they seek to justify and 
implement public efforts to promote the technology base for industry, however, politicians 
are powerfully constrained by the division of labor among knowledge-bearing elites. 
18 See especially Bruce Kogut, ·Country Capabilities and the Permeability 0 Borders,· Strategic Management 
Journal, 12 (1991): 33-47; Giovanni Dosi and Bruce Kogut, "National Specificities and the Context of Change" and 
other essays in Bruce Kogut, ed., Country Competitiveness: Technology and the Organizing of Work (New York: 
Oxford, 1993). 
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A. Outcomes: Categories of Technology Policy 
This paper focuses on state efforts to bolster competitiveness through promoting particular 
industrial technologies. As defined here, such technology policies exclude a range of related 
policy instruments including general education, trade protection, or anti-trust regimes. While 
these policies can all affect a country's competitive performance in important ways, their 
effects can be separated from those of explicit technology policies through carefully matched 
comparisons. This paper compares policies toward two industries in France and Germany in 
order to isolate the institutional factors that shape political efforts to promote technological 
levels. Technology policies necessarily involve the transfer of public funds -­
sometimes to firms, but also to trade associations, research institutes, and other intermediary 
organizations. Yet it is not the allocation of resources alone that makes technology policies 
distinctive. They are also differentiated by the goals, the recipients, and the conditions 
attached to them by the state. One of the most useful ways of categorizing technology 
policies is the distinction, developed by Henry Ergas, between "mission-oriented" and 
"diffusion-oriented" policies. While these terms rest mainly on the goals of policy, they are 
also useful for purposes of analytic explanation because the specific instruments devised to 
achieve these objectives are produced by highly characteristic policy processes. 19 It is these 
policy processes where the effect of knowledge-bearing elites becomes clear. 
19 These terms are drawn from Henry Ergas, "Does Technology Policy Matter"" in B. R. Guile and H. Brooks, 
Technology and Global Industry: Companies and Nations in the World Economy (Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press, 1987). 
10 
Mission-oriented policies involve large-scale projects that aim at creating specific 
technologies of direct interest to the state, usually for pursuing a discrete public mission. 
Mission-oriented policies are typically defense-related, although they can also be found in 
health, energy, or transportation infrastructure. They are usually justified by reference to 
national autonomy, national development plans, or national prestige. 
In addition to these goals, mission-oriented policies can be identified through their 
characteristic patterns of initiation, formulation, and implementation. Mission-oriented 
policies are typically initiated by the state. They are formulated by a small group of public 
officials who receive advice from at most a small group of non-state experts. And they 
allow public officials great discretion in choosing particular firms and specific technologies to 
be supported. 
Diffusion-oriented policies aim at establishing mechanisms to encourage the 
dissemination of capabilities throughout the economy. These policies often involve the 
provision of consulting or training services, information resources, incentives for 
collaborative research, and small-grant programs to help firms master the use of new generic 
technologies. 
Like mission-oriented policies, diffusion-oriented policies have characteristic patterns 
of initiation, formulation, and implementation. They are often initiated as much by non-state 
actors as by state agencies. They are typically formulated through discussion with a broad 
range of interested parties, including public officials, industry representatives, labor, and 
professional associations. Finally, diffusion-oriented policies are usually implemented by 
intermediary bodies such as professional or industry associations that distribute resources to 
11 
broad classes of recipients rather than a few firms selected by officials in the central 
administrations. 
B. Explanations: The Use of Knowledge as a Policy Resource 
Technology policies depend on different types of knowledge -- scientific learning, applied 
science and engineering, technical expertise, and practical know-how. These several types of 
knowledge cannot be allocated and reallocated like material resources, however, because they 
are carried by occupational groups. Since these groups have distinct occupational identities 
and particular avenues of access to the policy process, they shape public policies in patterned 
ways. These identities and avenues to political power in tum hinge on the historical 
processes by which knowledge-bearing elites emerge as recognized "professions." 
The formation of the expert professions has been a central topic in postwar sociology. 
According to Talcott Parson, the professions occupy a critical place in the structure of all 
complex societies. Parsons wrote that the professions provided "the institutional framework 
in which many of our most important social functions are carried on, notably the pursuit of 
science and liberal learning and its practical application in medicine, technology, law and 
teaching. ,,20 One possible extrapolation of this view was that occupational prestige 
20 Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure.· in Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: Free 
Press, 1964), as quoted in MaQal1 Sarfotti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977), xiii. 
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hierarchies were "invariant in all complex societies. tt21 Because all societies followed the 
same path of differentiation, particular occupations were granted the same degree of authority 
in all societies at the same stage of development. 
More recent studies have shown, however, that these prestige hierarchies grow out of 
specific historical experiences rather than a general developmental pattern. Knowledge-
bearing groups compete within one another to advance their claims for jurisdiction over the 
application of knowledge to solve particular tasks. While all expert groups appear to 
undergo a similar sequence of conflicts and internal changes as they gain professional status, 
the timing and scope of jurisdiction gained by different groups is not dictated by any abstract 
formula. 22 On the contrary, the prestige and legitimacy accorded to professional groups are 
inseparable from complex histories of intergroup competition and institution-building in 
which bargains with political authorities often playa major role. According to Magali 
Larson, these histories represent a particular group's "professionalization project. 1123 
The drive for recognition sought by most professions entails a mix of material 
advancement, organizational autonomy, and social prestige. This mix of goals makes it 
difficult to illuminate the political role played by the professions through a lens focused only 
on the structural links among organizations. Everett Hughes, whose view of the professions 
21 Donald J. Treiman, Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective (New York: Academic Press, 1977). 
22 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). See also John Van Maanen and Stephen R. Barley, "Occupational Communities: Culture and 
Control in Organizations,· Research in Organizational Behavior, 6 (1984). 
23 Magali Saristti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), esp. pp. 60 
ft. 
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hinged on the interplay of mandate and trust, also pointed to the normative basis of 
professional authority in questions of public policy. 
Every profession considers itself the proper body to set the 
terms in which some aspect of society, life or nature is to be 
thought of, and to define the general lines, or even the details, 
of public policy concerning it.24 
On this view, prestige is as much a resource as organizational autonomy or material position 
in the efforts of professional groups to maintain their role in public affairs. 
Since there is no abstract logic that dictates the trajectory of a professionalization 
project, the balance of power and prestige attached to a particular occupation can vary 
significantly across countries. Comparative studies show consistently that the knowledge-
bearing occupations in Continental Europe were discernibly more reliant on state authorities 
in their pursuit of professional status than were their British of American counterparts.25 
While the British and American professions sought to maintain their autonomy and to achieve 
an exclusive license to provide their services, similar groups in Central Europe were either 
incorporated within the state bureaucracy or they traded some of their autonomy in exchange 
for recognition from the state and the increased social prestige that accompanied such 
recognition. For France and Germany in particular, one result of these distinctive histories 
24 Everett Hughes, ·Professions,· Daedalus (Fall 1963): 667. 
26 JOrgen Kocka, ·'Burgertum' and the Professions in the Nineteenth Century" and other essays in Rolf 
Torstendahl and Michael Burrage. eds .• The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State and Strategy. See also 
Charles E. McClelland, The German Experience of Professionalization: Modern Learned Professions and their 
Organizations from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Hitler Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). esp. 
chapter 2. 
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is that the English word, "profession," has no good translation -- the reason the teno 
"knowledge-bearing occupation" comes closer to analytic neutrality.26 
These historical experiences mean that scientific learning and technical expertise are 
distributed very differently across the occupational maps that characterize different societies. 
For the policies examined in this paper, engineers are the central group. Their position in an 
occupational map is described by two dimensions. First, the degree to which the state itself 
defines the engineering profession has broad implications for the political access as well as 
the autonomy that engineers enjoy. Second, the distance that separates engineers from other 
knowledge-bearing groups in the occupational hierarchy has broad implications for the 
vertical flows of information among different groups involved in technological change. The 
differences that can be found along these dimensions are well illustrated by France and 
Germany. 
C. The Argument 
Since the occupational identities of expert groups are rooted in their relationship to 
political authority, they are shaped in important ways by each country's particular history of 
state formation. France is well known as a case where engineers quickly gained a central 
26 The French "profession" and German "Beruf" both translate as occupation, while the German "freie Berufe" 
refers specifically to self-employed rather than salaried specialists. These issues are discussed in McClelland, The 
German Experience of Professionalization, pp. 15-16, and Kocka, ·'BUrgertum:" 67 ff. 
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position in a system of "state-created elites ... T/ In 1794, shortly after the Revolution, the 
new Ecole PolytechniQue took over the training of military officers and became the prototype 
for the emndes ¢COles that trained Prance's civil servants in the nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries. By prohibiting guilds and occupational associations through the loi Ie 
Chapelier of 1791, the Constituent Assembly ensured that the self-images and organizational 
resources of the knowledge-bearing occupations would be stamped primarily by their training 
in state-run schools and career in public administrative services. Despite the social and 
political change that occurred during the nineteenth century, there were elements of 
remarkable continuity. 28 The educational system was one area where, even after the 
Second World War, the older attitudes "reigned supreme. "29 In particular, the pattern of 
centralized gate-keeping was extended in 1945 when the Ecole Nationale d'Administration 
O'ENA) was established to provide training for civil servants with specialties outside the 
natural or engineering sciences. 
A second characteristic of France's occupational structure was the deep gulf that 
separated the engineers trained in the elite &mndes ecoles from other technical occupations. 
For most of the postwar period, French educational hierarchies allowed surprisingly little 
possibility for continuing education, once an individual had begun active work life. Skilled 
workers and technicians had little chance of gaining further educational credentials. With 
27 This term is from Ezra Suleiman, Elites in France: the Politics of Survival (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978). See also Terry Shinn, "Reactionary Technologists: The Struggle over the Ecole Polytechnique, 1880­
1914," Minerva, 22:3/4 (Autumn 1984). 
28 For example, George Weisl, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France, 1863-1914 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983). 
29 Stanley Hoffmann, ·Paradoxes of the French Political Community," In Search of France (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 19631. 73. 
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sufficient seniority and internal promotion, technicians could sometimes become in-house 
engineers (incenieurs maisons), but their knowledge tended to be plant-specific and their 
career trajectories were entirely different from the inl:enieurs diplomes who had graduated 
from the elite engineering schools. This highly stratified educational system led in turn to a 
highly stratified career hierarchy for technically trained personnel. 30 
If France's social investment in science and technology was focused on a cohesive 
group of state-created elites, Germany's included a broader group of technical occupations 
that were certified but not created by the state. In the German case, engineers enjoyed 
neither the access to state power nor the social prestige that their French counterparts had 
gained by the early nineteenth century. For one thing, the values of Germany's educated 
middle classes (Bilduncsbiircertum) stressed humanism and classical learning more than 
technical prowess. More importantly, however, the sequence of industrialization and state-
building allowed German engineers a much less vaunted status than their French 
counterparts. Since heavy industrialization began in Germany before the creation of a unified 
state, German engineers established a base in private industry. Given their private-sector 
roots, the engineers based their quest for public recognition on the problems of Germany's 
growing industrial economy. One typical issue where they pressed their claim to 
competence concerned the regulation of steam boilers (the Dampfkesselkontrollfrace). 
Through such debates, the goals of industrial safety and reliability became central to 
30 On the stratified nature of French occupational hierarchies, see Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); Marc Maurice, Franc;ois Semer, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, The Social 
Foundations of Industrial Power: A Comparison of France and Germany, trans., A. Goldhammer (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1982. 1986); and Stephen Crawford, Technical Workers in an Advanced Society: The Work, Careers and 
Politics of French Engineers (NY: Cambridge, 1989). 
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the identity of the emerging profession. After the formation of the German Engineering 
Association (Verein Deutscher In&enieure, VDI) in 1856, the German engineers further 
advanced their position by fighting to control technical education and to gain protected status 
for the title, "engineer ... 31 
As German engineers gradually obtained state recognition, they remained part of a 
occupational hierarchy characterized by much stronger links among distinct occupations than 
could be found in France. Since German technical universities had strong regional ties, even 
the best known schools such as Aachen or Munich or Berlin could not generate as cohesive 
an elite as the French &randes ecoles. Basic and middle-level technical training in 
Germany's "dual system" also differed dramatically from that in France. The critical 
importance of intermediary institutions for training emerged through the bargains struck 
among industry groups and public agencies in the nineteenth century.32 In the twentieth 
century, the curricula (particularly the articulation of workplace training and classroom work) 
have been laboriously negotiated at the local level by the firms and schools, while the 
standard requirements for certification were approved at the regional and federal level by 
representatives of employers and trade unions. Owing to such arrangements, Germany's 
institutions for technical training and education have provided a continuous spectrum of 
practical and theoretical competencies. These competencies in tum comprised a much more 
31 Peter Lundgreen, "Die Vertretung technischer Expertise' im Interesse der gesamten Industrie Deutschlands' 
durch den VOl 1966 bis 1890," and other essays in Karl Heinz Ludwig, ed., Technik. Ingenieure und Gesellschaft: 
Geschichte des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure 1866-1981 (Dusseldorf: VOl-Verlag. 19811. 61 ff. See also Werner 
Conze and JOrgen Kocka, eds., BildungsbUrgertum im 19. Jahrhundert: Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung in 
international Vergleichen (Stuttgart: Klett·Cotta, 1986); Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds •• German 
Professions. 1800-1960 (NY: Oxford. 1990); and McClelland. The German Experience of Professionalization. 
32 JOrgen Schriewer, "intermediiire Instanzen, Selbstverwaltung und berufliche Ausbildungsstrukturen im 
historischen Vergleich." Zeitschrift fur Piidagogik, 32: 1 (1986). 
18 
tightly linked, or "organic, II occupational hierarchy than the sharply stratified hierarchy of 
technical occupations in France.33 These organic links among occupational groups have 
become one of the most widely examined contextual factors shaping industrial strategies and 
developments in Germany. 34 
These dimensions extract narrow elements from the complex histories of the technical 
elites in advanced societies, but they generate significant propositions about the types of 
technology policies that can be formulated and implemented in different countries. Countries 
where engineers enjoy high prestige in a hierarchy of state-created elites will show a 
predisposition toward mission-oriented policies. These elites are socialized in steep 
educational pyramids to see themselves as responsible for determining the public interest in 
matters of technology choice. Such elites are, in practice, often better trained for defining 
the state's activities in terms of specific, substantive missions than in terms of the 
indeterminate frameworks required for diffusion-oriented policies. 
By contrast, countries whose engineers are positioned within a system of state-
recognized occupations are predisposed toward diffusion-oriented technology policies. In 
such cases, engineers are based largely in the private sector. Acting as external advisory 
33 These links are analyzed in terms of "overlapping" skill sets in Arndt Sorge and Wolfgang Streeck, "Industrial 
Relations and Technical Change: The Case for an Extended Perspective," in Richard Hyman and Wolfgang Streeck, 
eds., New Technology and Industrial Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). For the complex negotiations required to 
change these skill sets, see Wolfgang Streeck, Josef Hilbert, K-H van Kevelaer, Friederike Maier, Hajo Weber, "The 
Role of the Social Partners in Vocational Training and Further Training in the Federal Republic of Germany" 
(Luxamburg: Amt fur amtl. Verc3ffentlichen der EG, 1987). 
34 These links are explored through individual career patterns in Charles Sabel, Work and Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). Their implications for industrial strategies and change are explored in Michael 
Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984); Sorge and 
Streeck, "Industrial Relations and Technical Change"; and David Soskice, "The Institutional Infrastructure for 
International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the U.K. and Germany," in A.B. Atkinson and R. Brunetta. 
eds., The Economics of the New Europe (London: Macmillan, 1993). 
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groups, they have little opportunity to control detailed parameters of large public projects and 
more opportunity to influence policy if they champion such general concerns as safety, 
reliability, and efficiency. Positions within the public bureaucracy are more apt to be held 
by lawyers, macroeconomists, and other professionals whose expertise is largely procedural 
rather than substantive. Such officials see themselves as responsible for coordinating 
competing social interests and they are in practice better trained to design regulatory 
frameworks than to set technical parameters of mission-oriented projects. When they do 
attempt mission-oriented projects, these officials possess neither the technical expertise nor 
the informal contacts in external networks that they would need in order to monitor such 
projects directly. 
The cross-cutting dimension that refers to linkages among occupations within a 
prestige hierarchy is more relevant to the implementation of policy. On this dimension, 
stratified occupational hierarchies may prove helpful in implementing mission-oriented 
policies but they are poorly suited for implementing diffusion-oriented policies. In stratified 
systems, the most prestigious occupations are sharply demarcated in status and competence 
from other occupations. If particular occupations span public- and private-sector 
organizations (as they often when members of state-created elites "descend" later in their 
careers to private organizations), then they can contribute to tight informal networks that 
facilitate the implementation of large-scale projects. Such marked separations, however, 
necessarily inhibit the implementation of diffusion-oriented policies. The same demarcations 
that create status distinctions in an occupational hierarchy tend very strongly to perpetuate 
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gaps in the kinds of skills that policy makers need to identify and mobilize in order to diffuse 
capabilities throughout an economy. 
Organic occupational prestige hierarchies need not inhibit mission-oriented policies, 
but they greatly facilitate the implementation of diffusion-oriented policies. Organic 
occupational hierarchies imply that there are few gaps in the types of knowledge that extends 
across a range of occupations. When skills are well articulated across occupations, 
policymakers are better able to identify the skills and to fashion incentive frameworks that 
will help managers support the skills needed for assimilating new products and processes. 
These propositions indicate that France and Germany should offer particularly clear 
cases of mission-oriented and diffusion-oriented policies. Leading an order of state-created 
elites, French policy makers are likely to think of their task as formulating mission-oriented 
policies. Moreover, with a highly stratified occupational hierarchy, France is poorly adapted 
to implement diffusion-oriented policies. Within an order of state-recognized elites, German 
policy makers are predisposed against mission-oriented policies. Moreover, Germany's or­
ganic hierarchy of technical occupations is likely to facilitate the implementation of diffusion­
oriented policies. The cases that follow offer powerful evidence for these tendencies. 
III. CASES 
Technology policies aim to solve problems that are inherently characterized by sector-specific 
circumstances. Indeed, the success of such policies often hinges on whether officials can 
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adapt policy instruments to fit the problems of particular industries. In practice, however, 
national patterns in technology promotion show surprising persistence: public officials tend to 
apply similar recipes across sectors whether or not those recipes are appropriate. The 
economic consequences represent an interaction of preferred policy recipes with sector­
specific circumstances. 
The two cases compared here -- telecommunications switching equipment and 
numerically controlled machine tools -- display dramatic variations on these sector-specific 
circumstances. Given their centrality for modem economies, it is not surprising that public 
agencies in France and Germany launched ambitious programs to promote technological 
levels in both sectors. Yet the policy experiences of the two countries were almost precisely 
inverse to one another. Public officials transformed the French telephone system through an 
exemplary case of mission-oriented policy, but they failed to find instruments that could do 
much of anything to ameliorate the technological backwardness of the machine-tool sector. 
German officials had difficulty promoting the desired changes in telecommunications 
switching technology, but they assembled a remarkably successful bundle of policies for 
encouraging technological change in Germany's crucial machine-tool sector. In both 
countries, the contours of policy were shaped as much by the relations among technical and 
administrative elites as by the constraints of organizational structure. 
22 
A. Telecommunications Switching Equipment. 
In both France and Germany, the telecommunications sector was a natural candidate for 
mission-oriented policy approaches. Telephone service was provided by public 
administrations in both countries, the PIT in France and the Deutsche Bundespost in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In the 1970s, the public authorities sought to prepare the 
introduction of new digital, or computerized, switching exchanges into their networks. The 
technology in question was a large, lumpy investment good, which was necessary for the 
fulfillment of an important public mission. Although the French PIT and the German 
Bundespost were granted remarkable organizational autonomy to pursue their mission, they 
utilized very different approaches for promoting technology levels within the public telephone 
system. 
1. Telecommunications -- France 
Telecommunications emerged as a priority sector in postwar France during 
preparations for the Seventh Plan, scheduled to run from 1975 to 1981. French planners had 
previously focused largely on heavy industries and export promotion. Yet the country's 
phone system urgently required attention.3S Although its elaboration was left to the new 
35 The main sources for this account include Catherine Bertho. Telegraphes et telephones: de Valmy au 
microprocesseur (Paris: Livres de Poche, 1982); Louis-Joseph Ubois, Genese et croissance des telecommunications 
(Paris: Masson, 1983); and Elie Cohen, Le Colbertisme "High Tech": Economie des Telecommunications et du grand 
proiet (Paris: Hachette, 1992). 
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cabinet appointed by Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, the telecommunications plan became an 
exemplary case of the Gaullist ~rand prQjet. As in other ~rands proiets, the state conducted 
research and development in a public research installation, financed development of a 
commercial prototype, and provided a market through public procurement. This recipe had 
been successfully used for nuclear power technologies, oil exploration, aerospace, and rail 
transport. In the 1970s, it was to be applied to telecommunications as well. 
A crucial element in these large-scale projects was the existence of specialist civil 
servants whose technical competence was adequate to monitor and link the various phases. 
Critics argued that the elite civil servants, or ~rands corps, were a closed network whose 
primary resources were political connections rather than genuine expertise. Indeed, for the 
large-scale technological projects, it was not sufficient to have the ~rands coms in the central 
Ministries unless other specialists with more specific capabilities could implement the 
programs. For France's massive effort to upgrade its telephone system, the implementation 
of specific measures was assured by the c01]>s des ingenieurs des telecommunications. 
Ironically, the infienieurs des telecommunications, who were not usually included among the 
vaunted ~rands coms in the 1970s, were one of the few administrative services or corps that 
did genuinely deliver the type of technical expertise on which the reputation of the fWlllds 
~ had originally been established. 
The ingenieurs des telecommunications coalesced in the early twentieth century, using 
research as a lever to advance the weight of the Direction Generate des Telecommunications 
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(the predecessor to France Telecom) within the PIT.36 Their base was greatly broadened 
by the founding in 1944 of a federation of laboratories known as the Centre National 
d'Etudes des Telecommunications (CNET). In 1970, a group of the younger engineers 
articulated a new mixture of entrepreneuralism and dirigist solutions in a pseudonymous 
analysis of France's "crise du telephone." By arguing that efficiency and performance could 
best be achieved through technical mastery, the authors highlighted the contributions of the 
in~enieurs des telecommunications in developing the public infrastructure. At the same time, 
they attacked the bureaucratic inertia of the PIT's administrative corps and argued for the 
kind of massive investments that were approved a few years later. 37 
Through their research activities in the CNET, the ingenieurs des telecommunications 
performed much of the early work on fully electronic phone exchanges. A prototype known 
as the PrQjet Platon (after the Greek philosopher Plato) was developed at a CNET laboratory 
in Lannion. When installed as the model E-I0 in 1970, it was the first fully-electronic 
switch to be used in a public operating network in the world. 38 
Through their positions within the DGT, the inf:enieurs des telecommunications were 
able to match the French state's procurement policies to the rapidly changing technical 
options being developed in the public laboratories. In 1976, fully-electronic switches such as 
the E-I0 were still viewed as esoteric products that might never become widely installed. 
36 For the ingenieurs des telecommunications. see Thierry Vedel, "Les ingenieurs des telecommunications,· 
Culture technique, 12 (March 1984); Catherine Bertho, "La recherche publique en telecommunications, 1880-1941,· 
Telecommunications, hor serie (October 1983); and Catherine Bertho, Telegraphes et telephones: de Valmy au 
microprocesseur (Paris: Livres de Poche, 1981). 453 ff. 
37 Ruges, Le telephone pour tous (Paris: du Seuit, 1970). 
38 Louis-Joseph Libois. Genese et croissance des telecommunications(Paris: Masson, 1983). 
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The French state's commercial strategy favored the Thomson company, which had been 
asked to develop two models based on semi-electronic technologies.39 In October, 1977, 
however, expert consensus shifted at a conference in Atlanta, Georgia, where speakers 
showed that component costs had declined enough to give fully-electronic switches superior 
cost-performance characteristics. Within a short time after the conference, the DGT shifted 
its commercial strategy to the newly favored fully-electronic technologies. This change 
created terrific difficulties for Thomson, which had no experience with fully-electronic 
designs. Suddenly the DGT expanded orders to the E-lO switch, whose development had 
been assigned to a group of ineenieurs des telecommunications working for Alcatel, a 
subsidiary of the Compagnie Generale d'Electricite. These changes in the French state's 
procurement priorities forced Thomson to exit the telecommunications sector in 1983, but 
they also helped Alcatel to become one of the world's premier suppliers of digital telephone 
exchanges.4o 
39 Semi-electronic switches (sometimes called space-division switches) are those in which all the control and 
billing functions were controlled by computers while the contact between parties was still made by miniature physical 
relays. Fully-electronic switches (time-division switches) are those in which the contact function is also effected by 
computer and voice signals are transmitted as digitized bit streams. 
40 For developments in the French telecommunications sector in the 19708 and 1980s, see J. Nicholas Ziegler, 
"The State and Technological Advance: Political Efforts for Industrial Change in France and the Federal RepUblic of 
Germany, 1972-1986" (Dissertation, Harvard University, 1989} as well as Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes, and Anne 
Stevens, "The Interaction bvetween Firms and the State in France: The Telecommunications and Consumer 
Electronics Sectors," in Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative Government-Industry Relations: 
Western Europe, the U.S., and Japan (Oxford: Clarendoft, 1887t, 10 ff. 
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2. Telecommunications -- Germany 
In terms of organizational structure, the Deutsche Bundespost was remarkably similar 
to the French PTI' in the 1960s. In addition, the challenges that digital switching technology 
posed for the German authorities were identical to those faced by the French. Yet, the 
policy responses were quite different. In the German case, the balance of techical expertise 
clearly lay with the private sector and the self-image of the Bundespost lacked the dramatic 
sense of technological vision found among the elite French engineers.41 
In keeping with the general trajectory of the engineering profession in Germany. 
communications engineers developed their base in the private sector. Although they were 
blocked from positions of public authority, German engineers did not reject the principal of 
state authority. On the contrary, the German Engineering Association lobbied to have the 
state's authority devolved to its own committees for the resolution of technical disputes. In 
the case of Siemens, salaried engineers adopted the civil servant as their model. As the 
term, Beamter, came to be reserved for public officials in the course of the nineteenth 
century, employees at Siemens and other large firms came to be known as Privatbeamter or 
"private civil servants. ,,42 
4. For German telecommunications, see Ziegler, ftThe State and Technological Advance ft ; Alan Cawson, et. at, 
Hostile Brothers: Competition and Closure in the European Electronics Industry (Oxford: Clarendon, 19901; Douglas 
Webber, ftThe Assault on the 'Fortress on the Rhine': the Politics of Telecommunications Deregulation in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. ft Paper delivered at the Conference of Europeanists, Washington. DC, October 30. 1987; and 
Raymund Werle, Telekommunikation in der Bundesrepubliki Expansion. Differenzierung. Transformation (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 19901. 
42 Jurgen Kocka. Unternehnemsverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens. 1847-1914 (Stuttgart: 
Ernst Klett, 1969). 148-192. 
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Early in the twentieth century, technical competence gravitated to the country's first 
substantial communications laboratory established by the Siemens company in Berlin.43 
Soon thereafter, the Imperial Technical Telegraph Bureau (TelelUi\Phentechnisches 
ReichsamO accepted Siemens designs as its own standards, provided that Siemens made its 
patents available to other smaller finns retained to fulfill public contracts.44 This policy of 
uniform standards (Einheitstechnik) showed that the German state could control the 
procurement process more effectively through procedural authority than through technical 
expertise. By requiring Siemens to license all approved technologies to alternative suppliers, 
the state avoided a bilateral relationship where in terms of technical expertise it was clearly 
the dependent party. 
The technological limitations of the Bundespost were not qualitatively different than 
those of its prewar predecessor, the Reichspost. The Central Office for Long-Distance 
Technology (Fernmeldetechnisches Zentralamt, FTZ) in Darmstadt employed about 2000 
persons by the 1980s, but its activities were very different from those of the CNET in 
France. The FTZ never included product development in its mission. Most of its work 
involved evaluating equipment and supervising the development projects undertaken by 
industrial suppliers, and its applied research agenda was driven by these other tasks.45 
43 Georg Siemens, Geschichte des Hauses Siemens, (Munich: Kerl Alber, 1947-19531, vol. III, 38 ff . 
.... Karl-Heinz Loesche and Dieter Leuthold, DeTeWe Chronik: Technisch-historisch Betrachtung des 
Firmengeschehens (Berlin: Deutsche Telephonwerke und Kabelindustrie, 19701, 131 and 199 n. 72. 
45 Deutsche Bundespost, Geschaftsbericht, 1982, 1983, 1984; Walter Niopek, Innovationsverhalten offentlicher 
Unternehmen: Determininanten, Tvpen und Funktionen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 19861. 179, 181. 
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Although the Bundespost chose Siemens designs for its first two major equipment 
renovations in the postwar period, the technological transformation brought by 
microelectronics in the 1970s upset the received pattern. In 1967, Siemens had begun work 
on a semi-electronic switch known as the EWS (Elektronisches Wahlsystem). Owing to 
progress in microelectronics, however, the EWS had to be almost continually redesigned in 
order to keep abreast of changing component technologies. Rapid changes in technology 
caused even more problems in the cumbersome process of confirming and then updating 
uniform standards among the different suppliers. As one official complained, once the 
Bundespost accepted a design, the FTZ "intrudes down to the 'last screw' in the development 
process itself and expects custom tailored technical systems from the firms. "46 
Further problems arose when the Atlanta conference of 1977 made it clear that non-
German purchasers would soon be demanding fully-electronic switching exchanges. After 
the conference, Siemens began taking signals from the international market. As it began 
work on fully-electronics technologies, the continuing problems with the EWS switch 
represented a growing liability. Finally in 1979, the EWS was abandoned and the 
Bundespost announced that it would evaluate prototypes for fully-electronic switches in 1981. 
In the end, the Bundespost solicited bids for digital switches, but it took a different and far 
more lengthy path to reach that point than had the French ine;enieurs des 
telecommunications.47 
46 Bundespost memorandum, quoted in Barbara Mettler-Meibom, Breitband technologie: uber die Chancen sozialer 
Vernunft in technologiepolitischen Entscheidungsprozessen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986). 301. 
47 Interview with former official of the Bundespost, Bonn, November 1988. See also "Schwarzer Freitag in 
Munchen: die Entwicklung des elektronischen Wiihlsystems fur des Telephon muB gestoppt werden,· Die Zeit 
(February 2, 1979); "Die Post ist frei,· Die Zeit (2 March 1979). 
29 
B. Machine Tools 
The goal of technological advance posed a very different challenge in the machine 
tool sector than in telecommunications. In both France and Germany, the sector was a 
natural candidate for diffusion-oriented policies. The industry in both countries consisted of 
numerous, geographically dispersed, specialist producers. The challenge was to help these 
traditional firms master microelectronics and incorporate software control mechanisms into 
their products. The amounts of capital required were within the means of both countries, 
and the technologies were in many cases relatively well known. The policy problem was to 
make these generic technologies available to smaller firms so that they could adapt them for 
particuar products and customers. 
1. Machine Tools -- France 
There were repeated efforts to support machine-tool producers in France between 
1975 and 1985.48 Sectoral plans were elaborated under the Giscard government and were 
48 French policies toward this sector are analyzed in Ziegler, "The State and Technological Advance." The 
organization and performance of the sector are also analyzed in Marc Maurice and Arndt Sorge, "Oynamique 
industrielle et capacit4 d'innovation de I'industrie de la machine-outil en France et en RFA: Analyse soci~tale des 
rapports entre 'espace de qualification' et 'espace industriel',· (Aix-en-Provence: LEST, January 1989); and Burkart 
Lutz and P. Veltz, "Maschinenbauer versus Informatiker," in K. 0011 and B. Lutz, eds., Technikentwicklung und 
Arbeitsteilung im internationalen yergleich (Frankfurt and New York: 19891. 
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expanded when the Socialist party took power under Mitterrand in 1981. All of these plans 
involved a combination of the following instruments:49 




public procurement plans, through which machine-tool users or public 

agencies were encouraged to purchase advanced tools; 

regional research centers outside Paris and in the eastern steel region 

near St. -Etienne; 

Itgrowth It contracts with individual fums who agreed to use new 

technologies in exchange for capital grants; 

financial restructuring for failing fums to encourage greater 

concentration in the industry. 

In practice, only the last two instruments -- growth contracts and financial restructuring -­
had much effect. These were the familiar instruments of bilateral policies used by French 
officials. In his classic work on capitalist planning, Andrew Shonfield mentioned the "80-20 
rule, It which held that effective planning was only feasible in industries where 80% of the 
output came from 20% of the firms. The machine-tool sector was (along with textiles) one 
which clearly deviated from the 80-20 rule. As Shonfield noted, some of the planners felt 
that nothing would help these sectors more "than the demise of a lot of small businesses and 
the emergence of a few dominant large ones. ,,50 
4.9 This account is based primarily on interviews with former officials from the Ministry of Industry. December 
1988. Supporting documentation includes Le Mondel13 January 1976); Nouvel Economiste. 297 (3 August 1981), 
28·29; Le Monde (3 December 1981), 1; l'Usine nouvelle (3 December 1981), 66·68; and l'Usine nouvelle (10 
December 1981), 82·83. 
60 Andrew Shonfield. Modern Capitalism (London: Oxford, 1966). 138. 
31 
The same preferences for central coordination and bilateral ties were extended to the 
task of technology promotion in the 1970s and 1980s. The government of Giscard d'Estaing 
assembled a bundle of instruments to assist the machine-tool sector in 1976. By 1979, 
however, the bankruptcy of the leading Ratier-Forest group led to a characteristic 
reorientation of policy. Two very different views of the automation process emerged within 
the competent committee, the Comite d'Orientation des Industries Stratei:igues (COOlS). 
One group, known as the mecaniciens, advocated a bottom-up or 'piecemeal approach to 
automation, which would allow separate machine-tools to be linked gradually together. 
Another group, known as the electroniciens favored a top-down approach, in which machine 
tools and robots were viewed as peripheral equipment within a centralized computer 
system.51 The debate was unambiguously resolved in favor of the electroniciens in early 
1981, when a new Director within the Ministry of Industry channelled resources to robotics 
and flexible manufacturing centers, mostly at large user firms such as Renault and Peugot. 
Although the new emphasis did much to help some of France's large manufacturers, it did 
little to help the machine-tool producers themselves. Several of the country's oldest tool 
makers -- Dufour, Ernault-Somua, Graffenstaden, and Line -- had mounting losses. 
Employment in the industry declined to 20,000 in 1980 from 27,000 in 1974.52 
After Fran<rois Mitterrand's election in 1981, the Socialist Party announced a new 
"Plan Machine-Dutil. tI The policy instruments were remarkably similar to those announced 
61 This debate is related in Pierre Dacier, Jean-Louis Levet, and Jean-Claude Tourret, Les dossiers noirs de 
I'industrie francaise (Paris: Fayard, 19861, 346-364, an account by individuals involved in subsequent policymaking 
under the Socialists. 
62 Le Monde (2 December 1980); l'Usine nouvelle {29 January): 62; l'Usine nouvelle (26 June 1981) 38. 
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by the Giscardiens six years before. There were somewhat enhanced intentions to bolster 
intennediate training in industrial electronics as well as to promote cooperative research in 
the industry. The main difference, however, lay in the increased funds (2.2 billion francs 
over three years) allocated to the sector. S3 
In practice, the instruments of financial restructuring again took precedence. One of 
France's leading finns in heavy machines, the Line group, neared insolvency almost 
immediately and prompted the Ministry of Industry to fonn a "pole" called Machines 
Fran~ses Lourdes (MFL) with the help of several nationalized manufacturing finns. 
Through 1982, officials at the DIMME (Direction des Industries Metallurgiques, Mecaniques 
et Electriques) spent much of their time planning similar mergers, often between weak finns 
that were longstanding rivals. One industrialist commented skeptically, "I can hardly see 
how one fonns fruitful enterprises by marrying cadavers."S4 
The industry's continuing problems prompted another policy reassessment. Under the 
influence of the Minister of Industry and Research, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the new policy 
orientation again envisioned radical technological achievements that would integrate 
electronics, capital goods, and manufacturing industries. Designated the "Plan Productique," 
the new policy would encourage firms to undertake pilot projects with automated machine 
tools. ss The ambitious technology goals of the Plan Productique left little room for 
63 For instruments and projected disbursements, see WMachine-outil: une industrie refayonnt'ie, W l'Usine nouvene 
(10 December 19811. 
64 unidentified observer quoted in l'Usine nouvelle 110 June 1982): 147: w ••• si les dt'ipots de bilan et les 
liquidations de biens se poursuivent, je vois mal comment on constituera des entreprises ft'icondes en mariant des 
cadavres. " 
55 Eric Le Boucher, "Le Crise de la machine-outil franyaise, W Le Monde (11 June 1983). 
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attention to firm-level training or human-resource development. Union spokesmen criticized 
the plan for ignoring the existing qualifications of machine operators. 56 Policymakers 
noted that the utility of purchasing new machines through the Education Ministry was also 
limited, because so few of the teachers knew how to use them.57 
The problems confronted by the Socialists and the Giscardiens alike were clearly 
rooted in the weakness of France's mechanical engineering and metalworking occupations. 
Mechanical engineering gained educational status when the Ecole Centrale des Arts et 
Metiers was founded in 1829, but the occupation never achieved the same status or the same 
access to policy circles as the "state engineers" from the Ponts et Chaussees or from Ecole 
des Mines. 58 In addition, machine operators and technicians were mostly trained on the job 
in plant-specific skills. Such training limited the mobility of employees and their ability to 
assimilate new skills and capabilities. 59 In short, the occupations pertinent to the machine-
tool sector -- mechanical engineers and skilled machinists -- were precisely those that were 
subordinated and marginalized in France's order of state-created elites. 
The stark separation between the IIstate engineers" and the mechanical engineers made 
it difficult for policy makers to gain detailed information on the problems of the 
manufacturing sector. As participant-observers of the Plan Machine-Outil remarked, 




61 Dacier, et. al., 343. 
68 James M. Edmonson, From Mecanicien to Ingenieur: Technical Education and the Machine Building Industry in 
Nineteenth-Century France (NY: Garland. 19871. 
ti9 Marc Maurice. Franc;ois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, The Social Foundations of Industrial Power: A 
Comparison of France and Germany, trans., A. Goldhammer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982, 1986), 36 ff. 
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As a group, French engineers preferred in the 1970s to join the ranks of the computer 
or electronics firms, or to make the jump into management positions. This 
disaffection for production, which touched an entire generation and which has 
probably not entirely disappeared, explained the current dearth of competent persons 
in this field. 60 
Given these preferences among engineering graduates, the strong social networks that 
underpinned the state's relations with other industrial sectors could not be easily replicated in 
mechanical engineering. 
To be sure, many French machine-tool firms were also weakened by their small size 
and traditional business practices,lSt but even the larger firms with more "modem" 
management suffered from gaps between occupational groups that carried the crucial skills. 
The distinctions among engineers were exacerbated by the gap between software specialists 
and skilled machine-tool builders. These were the practical and theoretical skills that had to 
be brought together in order to adapt computer numerical control (CNC) technology for the 
traditional machine-tool producers. Even though France's main CNC producer (a company 
called la Societe NUM) was very successful, its capabilities in software design did little to 
help the broader industry. During the 1980s, NUM spent 2.5% of its payroll -- more than 
twice the legal minimum -- for generic workforce training.1S2 In addition, NUM's business 
80 Dacier, et. aI., 342. 
6' This view is given in Maurice and Sorge, *Dynamique industrielle, * who document the discontinuities in 
France's skill base for metalworking, but give primary emphasis to the structural mismatch between France's largely 
*artisanal* machine· tool producers and their more "industria'" or Taylorist customers. For an analysis that stresses 
the primacy of the the skill deficit, see Lutz and Veltz, *Maschinenbauer versus Informatiker.· 
62 Interview with Personnel Director, Societe NUM, December 1988. This figure compares favorably to the legal 
minimum (1.1 %J, the average for mechanical 'engineering (1.26%), as well as the average for all French business 
(1.83%). The latter figures are from Groupe de Strategie Industrielle, no. 11, "De la mecanique traditionelle iJ la 
productique" (Commmissariat General du Plan: April 1983). 
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was well-suited to benefit from France's dirieiste style of policymaking. Since the state 
encouraged large users of machine tools to purchase software controllers from NUM, the 
company was able to increase its market share within France steadily. At the same time, 
however, NUM also increased the proportion of its revenues from sales to non-French 
producers from 8% in 1981 to approximately 30% in 1987.63 Indeed, as large French 
industrial users purchased their machine tools increasingly from non-French suppliers, NUM 
managed to adapt its CNC technology for the foreign machine-tool builders at least as 
quickly as for its French customers.64 It was revealing that the French state was able to 
pull NUM into business relations with many of Europe's most sophisticated machine tool 
producers even though it had trouble fostering similar links between NUM and many 
machine-tool producers within France. 
NUM's experience showed clearly that the difficulties between French machine-tool 
producers and their customers centered on the software knowledge in which NUM 
specialized. As a result of the gaps between software writers and machine-tool 
manufacturers, it proved nearly impossible for public officials to identify, much less bring 
together, employees with the skills that might have helped the smaller machine-tool firms to 
incorporate microelectronics into their products. Given these limitations, when policymakers 
in Paris encountered difficulties implementing their plans, they had few incentives to 
83 Revenues and exports from I' Usine nouvelle (26 March 1981), l'Usine nouvelle (10 June 1982)' and 
information supplied by NUM. 
64 On NUM's relations with Swiss and German firms, see especially Les Echos (14 December 1981) and NC 
Fertigung (July 1988): 70 ft. ­
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experiment and tended instead to cling ever more tenaciously to familiar policy instruments 
such as industrial concentration and capital-intensive pilot projects. 
2. Machine Tools -- Germany 
Like their French counterparts, German officials in Bonn also sought to support the 
machine-tool sector between 1975 and 1985. German producers were among the world 
leaders in output and export shares. In 1975, the sector employed approximately 100,000 
compared to 27,000 in France. Since the machine-tool makers were essential to the 
country's entire metalworking complex, their ability to adjust to the changing conditions of 
the 1970s and 1980s was a major issue for German policymakers. 
Nonetheless, German officials tended to design incentive-setting frameworks, which 
differed from France's discrete "plans" in several ways. Instead of focusing on bilateral 
discussions with individual firms, the German officials implemented most of their efforts 
through intermediary organizations. Rather than seeking mergers among the smaller firms, 
German policy makers designed programs specifically for the needs of small and medium-
sized enterprises. Finally, the German policies did not aim only at spectacular new 
technologies of automation, but instead countenanced several pathways by which firms might 
automate their production. 65 
e6 This account is extracted from Ziegler, "The State and Technological Advance." Some of the principal sources 
on the German machine-tool sector include H. Hirsch-Kreinsen, "Technische Entwicklungslinien und ihre 
Konsequenzen fOr die Arbeitsgestaltung," in Hirsch-Kreinsen and Rainer Schultz-Wild, eds., Rechnerintegrierte 
Produktion (NY: Campus, 1986); Burkhardt Lutz and P. Veltz, "Maschinenbauer versus Informatiker," in K. Dull and B. 
Lutz, eds., Technikentwicklung und Arbeitsteilung im internationalien Vergleich (Frankfurt: Campus, 199x); Gary 
Herrigel, "Industrial Order and the Politics of Industrial Change: Mechanical Engineering," in P. Katzenstein. ed., 
Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic (Ithaca: Cornell, 1989). 
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Policy for the machine-tool sector emerged in the 1970s amidst a larger debate on the 
state's role in industrial development. The proponents of Ordnun&s.politik prescribed an 
important but limited role for the state in maintaining proper framework conditions 
(Rahmenbedin&un&en) for healthy competition. The proponents of Struktur.politik argued 
that the state needed to promote positive adjustment strategies by supporting particular fmns 
and sectors through designated technology projects. 66 
In practice, policy for machine tools reflected an uneasy compromise between these 
views. In line with the principals of Strukturpolitik, the Federal Ministry for Research and 
Technology (Bundesministerium fOr Forschun& und Technologie, BMFr) provided a number 
of grants to Germany's major machine-tool fIrms during the 1970s. Later in the 1970s, civil 
servants in the Ministry also devised a set of instruments that came to be known as "indirect­
specifIc measures," which were quickly showcased when the Christian-Liberal coalition took 
power in 1982.67 Despite their infelicitous name, these measures effectively combined the 
priorities of Ordnungspolitik and Strukturpolitik. To avoid overturning market mechanisms 
for selecting technologies, these measures required that recipient fIrms fInance at least 50% 
of that proposed development program. In addition, grants were capped at relatively modest 
levels (between 400,000 DM and 800,000 DM) to discourage fIrms from altering their own 
investment plans too dramatically. The measures were specifIc in that they provided funds 
IJ8 The main statement of Strukturpolitik is found in Volker Hauff and Fritz Scharpf, TechnologiepoJitik als 
Strukturpolitik (Frankfun: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1976). For funher discussion, see also BMFT. Bundesbericht 
Forschung VI (Bonn: 1979). 16-16. and Winschaftswoche (14 March 1980). 
87 Osnabrucker Zeitung (22 October 1982): BMFT Brochure: "Neuorientieurng der Forschungs- und 
Technologiepolitik" (Bonn: 1984). For funher analysis of these developments, see Andreas Stucke, 
Institutionalisierung der Forschungspolitik: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Steuerungsprobleme des 
Bundesforschungsministeriums (Frankfun: Campus, 19931. esp, 171, 173. 
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for precisely defined generic technologies. They were indirect in that special external 
agencies administered them. 
The indirect-specific measures were complemented by a series of cooperative research 
projects (Verbundforschung), which linked a number of fmns and research institutes in joint 
research efforts promoted by the Research Ministry. Like the indirect-specific measures~ the 
cooperative research projects (Yerbundforschung) represented a carefully designed new 
policy instrument that aimed at making know-how available to a number of participating 
actors.68 For disseminating new generic technologies more broadly throughout the 
economy, the indirect-specific measures were the primary intended instrument. 
The indirect aspect of the programs had several advantages. By relying on external, 
non-governmental agencies CIriigerorganisationen), the Ministry could reach out to smaller 
enterprises that were not accustomed to applying for federal grants. In addition, the 
implementing organizations themselves became important repositories of highly specific 
knowledge about the problems faced by firms in mastering the designated' technologies. One 
of the most important implementing organizations was a new Technology Center in Berlin 
(the VDI-Technologiezentrum), established under the auspices of the German Engineering 
Association (VDI). Others included the research bureau within the industry association for 
mechanical engineering (Verein Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagebau, VDMA) and the 
Cooperative of Industrial Research Associations (Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller 
Forschungsvereinigungen AIF). The metalworkers union and the Fraunhofer institutes for 
88 For analysis of this program and component projects, see Susanne Lutz, Die Steuerung industrieller 
Forschungskooperation: Funktionsweise und Erfolgsbedingungen des staatlichen Forderinstrumentes 
Verbundforschung (Frankfurt: Cempus, 1993). 
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engineering sciences were not implementing organizations per se, but they were frequently 
consulted on the writing of guidelines for the indirect-specific programs. 
The indirect-specific measures proved extremely useful for encouraging smaller firms 
to experiment with microelectronics in their products and production processes. The first 
such program, entitled If Application of Microelectronics," was initiated on a trial basis in 
1979 and was budgetted at 450 million DM for the three years from 1981 through 1983. It 
gave rise to subsequent programs in production technologies (Programme Fertigungstechnik), 
sensor technology (MikrQPeripherik), and micro-machine systems (Mikroystemtechnik). All 
of these programs were administered by intermediary organizations.69 
Rather than the repeated reassessments and recentralizations of policy that occurred in 
France, German policies were characterized by the steady refinement of indirect-specific 
programs that complemented a number of joint projects administered directly from Bonn. A 
condition for this incremental change was the broad range of interlocutors involved in the 
process of formulating the policies. German administrative law required that the Research 
Ministry consult industry associations and organized labor while legislation was being 
drafted. When German officials brought engineers and other academic experts into their 
policy discussions, however, they were also following customary professional norms by 
recognizing the particular types of knowledge possessed by different groups outside the 
state. 
89 For the pilot program on the application of microelectronics, see BMFT, program brochures, and Heinrich 
Revermann, ed., Wirkungsanalyse zum "SonderDrogramm Anwendung der Mikroelektronik" (Markt & Technik, 1986). 
For the other programs, see BMFT, Program Brochures; Susanne Lutz, Die Steuerung industrieller, esp. 46-47; and 
Oliver Pfirrmann. "The diffusion of microsystem technologies: the case of the German innovation support programme 
'Microsystem Technology: Research Evaluation (April 1992). 
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The norms of consultation meant that German policies accommodated a number of 
different strategies. A significant example concerned the much-debated issue of factory 
automation. The advocates of centralized automation were based at the Fraunhofer Institute 
in Berlin; they were supported by some of the large engineering firms and tended to assign 
control functions in the workplace to white--collar computer programmers. A stepwise 
approach for decentralized automation was elaborated at the Fraunhofer Institute in Stuttgart. 
This approach proved more congenial to small firms that could not afford the risks of one-
shot automation, and it relied more heavily on skilled machinists who were able to work with 
a changing mix of mechanical and computerized machines.70 To the extent that it reflected 
the varied circumstances to which computer-assisted technologies could be adapted, the 
debate itself reflected the strengths of German policies. In France the electroniciens had 
triumphed decisively over the policy perspectives offerred by the mecaniciens. In Germany, 
policymakers intentionally supported a range of alternative strategies for applying new 
technologies to industrial problems. 
It is difficult to say whether the successful adjustment of the German machine-tool 
sector should be attributed to these federal policies or to the intrinsic strengths of the industry 
itself. It is indisputable, however, that the German policy measures were not accompanied 
by the same kind of dramatic decline that occurred in the French industry. As a share of 
world output, Germany's machine-tool production declined from 17.76% in 1975 to 14.75% 
in 1985; French production fell in the same period from 4.97% to 2.07% of world output. 
70 The German debate on computer integrated manufacturing can be traced through T. Martin, E. Ulich. and H.-J. 
Warnecke, • Angemessene Automation fur flexible Fertigung," Werkstatttechnik. 78 (1988): 17-23. 119-222; Rainer 
Schultz-Wild, "An der Schwelle zur Rechnerintegration,' VDI-Z, 130:9 (Sept. 1988): 40-46; Wolfgang Weber, "CNC 
Steuerungen fUr qualifizierte Facharbeit,' Technische Rundschau, 28 (1988): 14-18; and other sources cited in 
Ziegler, "The State and TechnoiogtctH AdYaooe.· 
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Meanwhile, German employment in the machine-tool sector fell roughly 14% from 102,000 
in 1975 to 88,000 in 1985; French employment fell by over 55% over the same period from 
26,859 to 12,050.71 
The ability of German policy makers to implement policies for diffusing electronics­
based technologies hinged on the relationships among occupational groups. For the machine­
tool sector, mechanical engineers and skilled machinists were the crucial occupations. In 
France, both of these occupational groups were separated from the central administrative elite 
by well-nigh insuperable barriers. Mechanical engineers were trained in practical skills that 
conferred much less status in France than the abstract, mathematical training of the state 
engineers in the public administration. Skilled machinists were represented strictly by 
French labor organizations. They had few ties to engineers of any kind and enjoyed virtually 
no access to policy discussions. The rigidities and impermeable distinctions that separated 
these groups weighed heavily in the frustrated efforts of French policy makers to incite 
technological change in the machine tool sector. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the corresponding groups enjoyed more 
deliberate and communicative relations with policymakers. Mechanical engineers dominated 
the German Engineering Association. Although they did not have the same access to 
positions of public office that the elite French engineers had, the German engineers had 
gained recognition as the country's main repository of knowledge for questions of industrial 
performance. Skilled machinists were represented through the metalworkers union, IG 
Metall. Not only did they have a voice in policy through the union. Owing to the 
71 Figures from the National Machine Tool Builders Association, Economic Handbook, various years. 
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possibilities for advancement through continuing education, the machinists had much less 
distant relations with engineers than did their French counterparts. To be sure, these groups 
were separated by hierarchical distinctions in Germany as in France. Yet, the hierarchical 
distinctions were different in quality. Rather than impermeable divisions, as in France, they 
were more permeable and organic links. The different occupations tended to recognize their 
respective areas of competence. The norms of competence and consultation that informed 
Germany's occupational hierarchy were one of the crucial factors that enabled policymakers 
to implement policies for boosting technological levels in the machine-tool sector. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These cases indicate that cross-sector as well as cross-national variation in the state's ability 
to promote technological advance can best be explained by examining relations among 
knowledge-bearing occupations. The relations between policymaking elites and technical 
occupations are particularly important because they help determine whether policies, once 
formulated, can be implemented. In a very general way, these cases indicate that not all 
states should be expected to perform all tasks. Yet some of the more specific capabilities 
and constraints can be summarized. 
In countries where technical expertise is concentrated among a group of state-created 
elites, public policy makers are predisposed to formulate mission-oriented strategies for 
promoting technological change. The distribution of expertise may also be well suited in 
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such countries for implementing mission-oriented policies, particularly if the linkages 
between state and non-state experts are close. French policy toward telecommunications in 
the 1980s exemplified such conditions. 
Countries with state-created technical elites have no advantage, however, in 
formulating diffusion-oriented policies. Moreoever, if the occupational prestige hierarchy is 
highly stratified, it will positively inhibit the implementation of diffusion-oriented policies -­
and further discourage policy makers from attempting such policies in future initiatives. 
French efforts to support the machine-tool sector exemplify these conditions. 
Countries where technicai expertise is embodied in state-recognized occupational 
groups are not likely to formulate mission-oriented strategies. Civil servants trained in 
procedural disciplines will be predisposed toward regulatory instruments of policy and may 
be poorly qualified to monitor mission-oriented projects. German efforts to promote the 
development of digital switches exemplified these conditions. 
If countries with state-recognized occupations are disadvantaged in the formulation of 
mission-oriented policies, however, they may be well suited for implementing diffusion­
oriented policies. If such occupations are linked through organic and continuously graded 
occupational hierarchies, they can serve as powerful instruments for the transfer of new 
technologies among firms. The apparently successful policies that Germany assembled for 
the machine tool industry relied heavily on such conditions. 
These conclusions raise the issue of generalizability. One question is whether 
occupational relations in countries besides France and Germany are correctly described by 
the dimensions of dependence on state legitimation and organic versus stratified linkages with 
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other occupational groups. It is sometimes noted, for instance, that white collar workers in 
Japan have little occupational identity independent of the organizations for which they work ­
- creating an organizationally bounded norm for professional status.n In the United States, 
by contrast, the professions are said to be "self-regulating" and there appears to be more 
occupational effervescence in the sense of new groups claiming "professional" status.73 
At the same time, the dimensions generated by the French-German comparison 
provide unmistakable insights into public strategies for raising technological levels in other 
countries. It is clear that these dimensions are empirically and logically independent. For 
instance, an institutional framework supporting state-created elites need not necessarily - as 
in France -- imply a stratified occupational prestige hierarchy. In a country where state-
created elites presided over a more organic hierarchy among occupations, policy makers 
would be predisposed to formulate mission-oriented policy strategies but they would be able 
to draw on extensive societal resources in implementing diffusion-oriented policies. Such 
conditions appear to describe at least some important policy areas in Japan. The role of 
Japanese civil servants in mission-oriented technology policies is well known.74 Yet, in the 
diffusion of new technologies, there is rich evidence of the pivotal role played by 
72 For evidence of this phenomenon among electrical engineers, see Eleanor Westney arid Kiyonori Sakakibari, 
"Designing the Designers: Computer R&D in the United States and Japan," Technology Review, 89:3 (April 19861. 
73 Harold Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1964): 137-168; 
Bonalyn J. Nelsen and Stephen R. Barley. "The Social Negotiation of a Recognized Occupational Identity:." Working 
Paper, National Center for the Educational Quality of the Workforce. University of Pennsylvania. 1993. 
74 The now-classic account is Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1922-1976 (Stanford University Press: 1982). 
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professional ties and associations in broad-based efforts for quality and process improvement 
among Japanese firms. 75 
Similarly, there is no logical or "transhistorical" reason that countries with state-
recognized professional groups need be organized into organic occupational hierarchies. In a 
country where more autonomous professional elites sat atop a highly stratified occupational 
prestige hierarchy, policymakers would Shy away from mission-oriented technology policies 
but would also suffer from poor information and scattered societal resources in their efforts 
to implement policies for diffusing new technologies. Such conditions clearly describe the 
United States, where the federal officials have rarely welcomed explicit industrial policy and 
where efforts at skill development and technology diffusion have been left to a welter of 
uncoordinated experiments at the state and local levels. 76 
The case for a broadened view of institutions that would include the visions and self-
images of occupational groups cannot be established on the basis of four neatly paired cases 
of policy for competitiveness. Still, it is worth identifying some of the issues in comparative 
politics where such an approach could make a contribution. The cases examined here show 
76 The important role of the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers in supporting grass-roots efforts to 
promote quality and process improvement among Japanese firms is illuminated in Robert Cole, Strategies for 
Learning: Small-Group Activities in American. Japanese. and Swedish Industrv (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), especially chapter 13 and pages 301-303. For the importence of professional ties in diffusing 
technologies in the Japanese aerospace and related industries, see Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation. Strong Army": 
National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming, 
1994). 
78 For state and local programs in the U.S. cese, see David Osborne, Laboratories of Democracv: A New Breed of 
Governor Creates Models for National Growth IBoston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988). end Stephen Hamilton, 
Apprenticeship for Adulthood INY: Free Press, 1990). For the very different type of coordination issues present in 
Germany's federel structure. see Fritz W. Scharpf. Bernd Reissert. and Hans Schnabel, Politikverflechtung: Theorie 
und Empirie des kooperativen F6deralismus in der Bundesrepublik (Kronberg: Skriptor, 1976) and, in the case of 
technology policy. Edgar Grande, "Staatliche Steuerungspotentiale in der Informationstechnik-Politik" (Manuscript: 
Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne, 1993). 
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that occupational identities and networks rank among the most distinctive institutional 
characteristics of advanced societies. Occupational identities rest on jurisdictional claims that 
elites are reluctant to jeopardize, while occupational networks help shape the information 
pathways by which state and non-state actors communicate. Substantive analysis of such 
identities and networks can explain why }X)licymakers in different countries apply 
characteristic }X)licy approaches, even when those approaches are clearly inappropriate to the 
specific challenges at hand. 
These findings are especially relevant to areas of state action -- such as technology 
}X)licy -- where there is high uncertainty and where abstract as well as practical knowledge is 
required for successful }X)licy implementation. Yet, there are several reasons that the model 
of professional networks is likely to become more salient. As hierarchical forms of 
organization give way to more flexible forms, the interpersonal links fostered by professional 
affinities may begin to rival organizationally programmed contacts and routines.TI From 
management's perspective, the professional network is an attractive model for inspiring trust 
and loyalty from employees who are expected to exercise discretion without much 
oversight.78 Indeed, such a model appears increasingly attractive as the trend toward 
corporate downsizing takes away the firm's ability to assure its employees much job security. 
These developments render the internal }X)litics of professional groups more salient as 
77 On the relative salience of interpersonal and interorganizational networks, see Walter Powell, "Neither Market 
nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,· Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol 12 (1990) and Renate 
Mayntz, "Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks," Knowledge and Policv: The International 
Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization, 6:1 (Spring 19931: 3-16. On professional networks and knowledge 
diffusion, see Annalee Saxenian, "The Origins and Dynamics of Production Networks in Silicon Valley,· Research 
Policy 20 (1991): 423-437, and John Aric, "Technical Knowledgte and Technology Diffusion: New Issues for U,S. 
Government Policy," Technology Analysis and Strategic Management , 5:4 (19931: 369-383. 
18 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, When Giants Learn to Dance: Mastering the Challenge of Strategy. Management, and 
Careers in the 1990s (NY: Simon and Scbu8tet', 1i8~. 
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received recipes for the macroeconomic management of employment and investment give 
way to finn- and industry-level recipes for competitive performance. 
While especially useful in explaining the persistence of policy approaches over time, 
the analysis of occupational identities and networks also helps to illuminate the conditions 
under which policy adaptation and learning can occur. Vertical as well as horizontal links 
are at issue. The vertical relations that link superordinate public agencies to private-sector 
organizations can be facilitated by interpersonal ties that have the character of horizontal 
linkages among members of the same professional groups. But vertical links among 
members of different occupational groups are equally important. As shown in the cases 
compared here, misguided or poorly implemented policies can only be corrected where the 
linkages among different levels in an occupational hierarchy can carry the information 
required for evaluating past policies and shaping future strategies.79 If the first condition is 
satisfied, then particular knowledge-bearing groups that span state and non-state organizations 
can act as "transmission belts" that enable policy learning to occur. 80 
Yet, possibilities for policy change are facilitated by professional formations only 
within certain constraints. While occupational identities can change, the scope for change is 
limited by the jurisdictional claims that occupational groups have established. Not only do 
claims to new or expanded jurisdictions have to be advanced through painstaking negotiations 
70 For the general problem of policy feedback, see Paul Pierson, ~When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback 
and Political Change," World Politics. 46:4 (July 19931: 696-628. 
80 For policy adaptation through social learning, see Peter A. Hall, "Policy paradigms, social learning, and the 
state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain," Comparative Politics, 26:3 (April 19931. For policy change 
through negotiation and coordination, see Fritz Scharpf, 'Positive und negative Koordination in 
Verhandlungssystemen." MPIFG Discussion Paper 93/1 (Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut fOr Gesellschaftsforschung, 
1993). 
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or incremental legitimation; these new claims have to be compatible with the symbolic 
resources that an occupational group has invoked in the past. At a theoretical level, this 
analysis therefore develops the view that group interests cannot be inferred from 
organizational structure alone. 81 If an occupational group enjoys the status of a recognized 
profession, its members will perceive opportunities partly from the organizations in which 
they work, but partly from within the larger transorganizational network of individuals to 
which they belong. As a result, the collective preferences of such knowledge-bearing elites 
are not formed within any single organization. Moreover, since knowledge-bearing elites 
gain professional status by appealing to a symbolic conception of society's general interest, 
their self-images are necessarily formed in terms that include more than the material utilities 
of their members. Together, the transorganizational and symbolic components in 
professional identities point to important aspects of institutional life that cannot be captured 
by structural analysis alone. The visions and commitments of knowledge-bearing elites exert 
their own persistent and sometimes decisive effect on public strategies for competitiveness. 
If this analysis is correct, it suggests that professional identities comprise an important 
obstacle to the convergence of economic institutions in the advanced industrial countries. 82 
The movement toward integration of the internal market in Europe represents the most 
serious effort among advanced countries to bring domestic institutions into conformity with a 
single model. Much of the resistance to European integration so far has been attributed to 
81 See Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in S. Steinmo, K. 
Thelen, and F. Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 19921. 
82 For the emerging politics of institutional convergence, see the conference proceedings reported in "Domestic 
Institutions, Free Trade, and the Pressures for National Convergence: the United State, Europe, and Japan" 
(Cambridge: MIT Industrial Performance Center Working Paper 93-002wp, 1993). 
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economic interest groups and nationalist political parties. Even if it were uncontested by 
these actors, however, Ee policy for institutional "harmonization" could not directly 
transform the norms and practices sustained by professional identities. As long as 
knowledge-bearing elites are able to mobilize different kinds of political and symbolic 
resources in different countries, they will continue to sustain distinctive conventions for 
making policy and doing business. 
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